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Abstract— The paper focuses on characterisation of 
information hiding possibilities in Cloud Computing. After 
general introduction to cloud computing and its security we 
move to brief description of steganography. In particular we 
introduce classification of steganographic communication 
scenarios in cloud computing which is based on location of the 
steganograms receiver. These scenarios as well as the threats 
that steganographic methods can cause must be taken into 
account when designing secure cloud computing services. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is a very popular but still evolving 
paradigm. It allows customers of cloud providers to avoid 
start-up costs and/or reduce operating cost. It also increases 
their flexibility by immediately acquiring services and 
infrastructural resources when needed. NIST (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology) defines cloud 
computing as [1]: “a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction”. Key characteristics of cloud 
computing include: on-demand self-service, broad network 
access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured 
service. NIST defines also three service models in which 
cloud users control: 
1. Only user-specific application configurations. It is 
called SaaS (Software as a Service), 
2. Deployed applications and possibly application hosting 
environment configurations. It is called PaaS (Platform 
as a Service), 
3. Everything (e.g. operating systems, storage, deployed 
applications) except the underlying cloud infrastructure. 
It is called IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service). 
 
II. SECURITY OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
However, cloud computing uniqueness when compared 
with previous computing approaches launched new security, 
privacy and trust challenges from which most important are 
[2]: 
1. Ensuring that only authorized parties have access to 
user data even if it is a service provider, 
2. Sharing responsibility between cloud provider and its 
customer for security and privacy, 
3. Providing secure multi-tenant environment (secure and 
efficient partitioning of virtualized and shared 
infrastructure among different customers). 
 
Cloud Security Alliance defined seven most important 
threats for cloud computing [3] (only those who required it 
were commented): 
- Threat #1: Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud 
Computing (different “activities” e.g. spamming, 
malware code, passwords cracking, DDoS attacks, 
botnet C&C etc.), 
- Threat #2: Malicious Insiders, 
- Threat #3: Data Loss or Leakage, 
- Threat #4: Account or Service Hijacking, 
- Threat #5: Insecure Interfaces and APIs. 
- Threat #6: Shared Technology Issues – many 
underlying components of cloud computing services 
were not designed to offer strong isolation for multi-
tenancy. Attackers focus on the operations of other 
cloud customers, and how to gain unauthorized 
access to their data, 
- Threat #7: Unknown Risk Profile - ambiguous 
information about with who you will be sharing your 
infrastructure, in addition to logging data e.g. 
network intrusion logs, redirection attempts and/or 
successes etc. 
 
Abovementioned threats can be divided into two groups. 
First, well-known threats group (Threats #1-5) which can be 
amplified by utilizing cloud computing environment. For 
example, attacks that used to be specific to a particular 
operating system in cloud computing become cross-platform. 
Second, cloud-specific threats group that exploit cloud 
computing characteristic features (Threats #6-7).  
 
III. STEGANOGRAPHY IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
Steganographic techniques can be used to provide a 
perfect tool for data exfiltration, to enable network attacks or 
hidden communication among secret parties. The aim of 
these techniques is to hide secret data (steganograms) in the 
innocent looking carrier e.g. in normal transmissions of 
users. In ideal situation hidden data exchange cannot be 
detected by third parties. The best carrier for steganograms 
must possess two features: it should be popular i.e. usage 
such carrier should not be considered as an anomaly itself 
and modification of the carrier related to inserting the 
steganogram should not be “visible” to third party not aware 
of the steganographic procedure. 
And how to find a carrier that would fill abovementioned 
requirements? In the Internet today we witness expansion of 
different, advanced Internet services from which more and 
more are migrating to abovementioned cloud computing 
services. The major cloud service providers are significantly 
investing in their infrastructure and in acquiring customers, 
big players list include: Google (Gmail, GoogleDoc), 
Microsoft (Azure), Amazon (Amazon Web Services), Cisco 
(WebEx). And these services utilise sometimes complex 
protocols and infrastructures to achieve their goals. Thus, 
they are perfect candidates for secret data carriers.  
 
 
Figure 1. Hidden communication scenarios for cloud computing 
environment  
(CSI – Cloud Service Instance, C – Cloud Clients/Customers) 
 
We propose to consider three types of steganographic 
communication in cloud computing based on where the 
steganograms receiver (SR) is placed (Fig. 1). All these 
scenarios requires, of course, hiding intentions with which 
cloud services will be used: 
(1) SR is situated in the same cloud instance as 
steganogram sender (SS). This case considers the 
scenario in which two cloud service users exchange 
confidential data for which at least one of them is 
unauthorised. Such communication includes utilisation 
of the so called network steganography – methods that 
as a carrier of secret data use network protocols (data 
units or the way they are exchanged), or relations 
between two or more protocols to enable hidden 
communication. This can lead to the realisation of the 
Threats #1-3. 
(2) SR is situated outside the cloud service environment 
and cloud service capabilities are used to perform 
network attacks. In this case steganographic 
communication can be used e.g. to coordinate cloud 
botnet or malwares [4]. This type of communication 
includes also utilisation of network steganography. This 
can lead to the realisation of the Threats #1-3. 
(3) SR is situated in the different cloud instance than SS. 
Such communication includes utilisation of the covert 
channel by using shared resources. Such solution were 
proposed based on data cross deduplication mechanism 
[5] or caches shared by services instances on the same 
physical machines [6]. This can lead to the realisation 
of the Threats #1-3 and 7. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
To conclude, cloud computing as a carrier for secret 
communication is not very different from any other popular 
steganographic carriers e.g. like IP telephony [7]. The main 
novelty in this area when compared with known hidden data 
exchange opportunities is possibility of enabling secret 
communication between two instances of cloud services. 
Steganography should be treated for cloud computing 
environment as a rising threat to the network security as it is 
seen for typical networking ones.  
Presented in this paper hidden communication scenarios 
as well as the threats that steganographic methods can cause 
must be taken into account when designing secure cloud 
computing services. 
In order to minimize the potential threat of malicious use 
of steganography to public security effective steganalysis 
(detection) methods are needed. This requires in-depth 
understanding of the functionality of particular cloud service 
and the ways it can be used to enable hidden communication. 
Considering however variety and complexity of the cloud 
computing services there is not much hope that a universal 
and effective steganalysis method can be developed. 
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